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Seeing slavery in seafood supply chains
Katrina Nakamura1*, Lori Bishop2, Trevor Ward3, Ganapathiraju Pramod4,  
Dominic Chakra Thomson5, Patima Tungpuchayakul6, Sompong Srakaew6
The seafood supply chain is often long and fragmented, and slavery is a tenacious problem. The vast majority of 
workers are engaged in the early stages of production and often employed through subcontracts or brokers. We 
hypothesized that food companies could identify risks and implement improvements by adding a labor safety 
dimension to their tracking and traceability systems. We designed a five-point framework—the Labor Safe 
Screen—and tested it for 118 products. The framework combines the use of technology in existing platforms with 
the collection of industry data and authoritative human rights data. Eighteen food companies used three or more 
components of the framework and systematically documented their supply chains, engaged suppliers, and cross-
checked results. The companies were able to identify areas where working conditions met minimum principles, 
were unknown, or were inadequate. Three companies also incorporated direct worker feedback to focus resources 
and improve working conditions. We conclude that food companies can effectively and efficiently assess and reduce 
risks of forced labor in seafood supply chains—not to claim “no slavery” but to greatly improve their awareness of 
the labor conditions in the making of the products they trade and to identify feasible targets for further diligence 
and remedies.
INTRODUCTION
In the global seafood industry, flows of raw materials from fishing 
vessels and aquaculture farms are tracked over long distances with 
incredible accuracy, but the hands pulling fish from the net disappear 
from sight. Most consumers are unfamiliar with where and how the 
largely imported seafood they eat is caught or the sector’s impacts on 
local livelihoods and fishing communities (1). Benefits have shifted 
with technological innovation to the centralized and capital-intensive 
operations of global companies, and the ethics of work have also 
shifted (2). At least 260 million people depend on seafood work (3) 
(some estimates are 800 million), and the sector is possibly the world’s 
largest employer. Sixty-five percent to 70% of seafood for export 
markets is produced in developing countries (4) where labor costs 
are relatively low. For the rural poor, increasing work opportunities in 
distant water fleets, aquaculture areas, and processing hubs (2) offset 
decreasing local opportunities for seafood work, but this may re-
quire migration and dependence on labor brokers (5, 6). Seafood is 
made with a significant incidence of forced labor, child labor, or forced 
child labor in the seafood hub countries of Indonesia, Thailand, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Peru (7). In 2016, widespread forced 
labor in seafood work was reported in 47 countries (8), with incidents 
reported in additional countries, including New Zealand, Ireland, the 
United States, and Taiwan.
Forced labor is defined by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) as “work or service exacted from any person under the menace 
of penalty and for which the person has not offered himself voluntarily” 
(9). Recent legislative changes have made food companies liable for 
the working conditions behind the goods they sell; for example, the 
UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) and revised trade enforcement pro-
cedures in the United States (2016) (10). Large companies doing 
business in California are obliged to disclose their efforts to address 
forced labor in supply chains, if any (11), and there are similar rules 
in the UK and France. A blueprint is provided for businesses to follow 
in the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, par-
ticularly its protect, respect, and remedy framework that stems 
from the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons (Palermo Protocol). The Work in Fishing Convention 188 
(12) came into force in 2017 and provides explicit guidance for safe 
labor in fishing operations. Every member country to the ILO is 
bound by Convention 29 on Forced Labor and seven related con-
ventions, and companies can appeal to regulators in their operating 
areas to step up labor enforcement. They can also join regional pro-
grams like the ILO project to protect migrant workers in Thailand’s 
fishing sector.
Public data regarding forced labor in seafood production are also 
available; for example, the Sweat and Toil smartphone application 
published by the U.S. Department of Labor contains relevant, country- 
level data, including a “list of goods produced by child labor or forced 
labor,” a “list of products produced by forced or indentured child 
labor,” and “findings on the worst forms of child labor” (7). The 
ILO, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Action 
for the Cooperation to Prevent Human Trafficking (UN-ACT), Nexus 
Institute, and Human Rights Watch have published findings on forced 
labor risk in seafood.
While the normative framework and tracking of country-level 
findings are largely in place, companies lack mechanisms to collect 
the human-scale data needed for identifying and remediating forced 
labor risks inside their supply chain. The challenges are numerous. 
First, the nature of fishing work is fundamentally different from other 
labor-intensive industries, and these differences can mask workers’ vol-
untary or involuntary status. Fishing vessels operate remotely and are 
physically isolated. Working hours are determined by ocean conditions 
and the around-the-clock duties needed to keep the vessel oper-
ating safely. Payment for work most frequently is a share of the catch 
value (13) based on seniority. A senior crew member earning thou-
sands of dollars on a trip may work alongside a new crew member 
earning a minimum wage equivalent or less if trip costs or broker 
fees are deducted (14). Labor agencies supply a mix of professional 
crew from seafaring nations such as the Philippines, Chile, or Ukraine, 
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and less- skilled and lower-cost crew from countries such as Myanmar, 
China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia (15), and Nepal. Less-skilled 
crew who are working in a foreign language environment without 
legal standing in the vessel’s flag state are vulnerable to involuntary 
and unpaid work (5, 6, 16), particularly where a distant labor agent is 
the direct employer rather than the vessel owner (17). Forced labor 
should not be presumed from vulnerable conditions alone, however, 
because fishing wages provide dignified livelihoods and an escape from 
poverty for millions of fishers and crew.
Second, the traceability of seafood origins is still poorly imple-
mented in some areas, and peer-reviewed research about hired workers 
is scarce (18, 19). At the beginning of our study, fishing boat slavery 
had already appeared in the U.S. media (20), and executives stated a 
preference for addressing risks in the supply chain internally with 
facility audits. We agreed that food companies with a strong relation-
ship to a few suppliers could complete onsite assessments but pointed 
to ILO findings that forced labor conditions are generally hidden; 
for example, the owners and supervisors of boats, farms and plants 
may not know the actual wage details for the workers in their facilities, 
where labor is contracted to a broker (6) or that some are indentured 
and paying ongoing fees.
Third, a data gap separates the industry and human rights sphere. 
Slavery in seafood was described as a tenacious and prevalent problem 
in Southeast Asia and international fishing fleets, based on our 12 in-
terviews with human trafficking experts at the beginning of the study 
period in 2013. By contrast, slavery in seafood was described as an 
isolated and aberrant problem in eight interviews with senior sea-
food executives in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, 
and Thailand in 2013. The human trafficking experts had gathered 
significant evidence of forced labor in seafood. However, their or-
ganizations had only limited relationships with the seafood industry 
at that time, limiting their access to data and avenues to effect change. 
The seafood companies gathered evidence to comply with legal and 
customs requirements and had limited access to worker data, human 
rights findings, and avenues to effect change. The data available sug-
gest that the working conditions that allow for forced labor are 
nuanced, and risk identification requires firsthand worker per-
spectives (21–23). Any interpretation of forced labor conditions is 
influenced by language and trust, and any preconceived notions about 
what a victim of forced labor looks like and how a victim behaves 
can aggravate consequences for human beings (24, 25). To collect worker 
data effectively, both the industry and human rights spheres needed 
new relationships and methods.
We considered that companies could collect and combine previ-
ously incompatible data sources like working conditions in the supply 
chain, even worker aspirations (26). Food companies have buying 
leverage and use digital technology to manage production across the 
supply chain, for example; within agreed time and temperature con-
trols for food safety (18). The same technology provides a powerful 
mechanism to implement responsibility and control for ethics in the 
supply chain (26). Opening the “black box” of worker knowledge 
and behavior could incorporate a broader representation of seafood 
sustainability that can better represent social goals (1). Here, we com-
bined the strengths of existing policy, technology, and data platforms 
and developed a five-point framework for data sharing among mul-
tiple parties, such as the exporters and processors providing the ma-
jority of the product and human rights authorities with standing in 
the social context of production. We screened a wide variety of sea-
food products with long and fragmented supply chains, and here, 
we report on the process and our findings.
RESULTS
We screened 118 seafood products between 2014 and 2017 with 18 
participating food companies. We produced accurate pictures of work-
ing conditions across each supply chain. To do it, we developed a 
five-point framework—the Labor Safe Screen (LSS)—which features 
triangulation of data from suppliers, human rights authorities, and 
workers for a progressively finer resolution of working conditions, 
moving from the product’s country-level origins upstream into the 
workplace (Fig. 1). We combined data-driven and human-focused 
methods to produce an evidence-based and intersectoral systems ap-
proach to illuminate blind spots in production. This shifted the basis 
of screening from attempting to prove or to disprove specific forced 
labor cases toward the establishment of system fundamentals for 
human rights due diligence. Our research produced general findings 
also on transparency and working conditions in farmed shrimp, surimi, 
and Pacific tuna seafood segments of the sector.
In the five-point LSS framework, four components were used for 
risk identification: (i) product screening for country-level origins and 
standing on forced labor in seafood, (ii) a template to map the supply 
chain, (iii) an algorithm to estimate risk in fishing operations, and 
(iv) surveys to collect proof of protective conditions in the work-
place. The fifth component is a set of principles for minimum pro-
tective conditions in the workplace and supporting templates for a 
code of conduct, universal contract, grievance mechanism, and dis-
closure of efforts. Companies used this component to incorporate 
findings from the earlier components and correct work conditions.
The majority of the participating food companies carry hundreds 
of seafood products, and they sought to learn which products were 
of concern to human rights authorities. We developed a tiered ap-
proach for screening a large number of products, with quantitative, 
scoring for persistent risks moving upstream into the supply chain 
and the workplace (Fig. 2). Companies using this approach screened 
all products at tier 1 (LSS component 1) and fewer products at 
tier 2 (LSS components 2 and 3) and tier 3 (LSS components 4 and 5).
Fig. 1. LSS components and flow.
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To extend the coverage of our framework, we developed a process 
for continuously monitoring products—a decision tree with rule sets 
that can be populated with accessible data. The decision tree is an 
automated version of LSS components 1 and 4 and was embedded 
in food traceability software used by large U.S. grocers and seafood 
companies worldwide. The software owner, Trace Register LLC of 
Seattle, receives and communicates supplier data to its users for food 
safety and other types of compliance. Automation enables companies 
to learn which of their products are associated with country-level 
risks and to demonstrate, or begin steps toward, due diligence in 
human rights and disclosure to their customers.
Screen product origins against risks documented by human 
rights authorities
The first component in the five-point LSS framework is product 
screening for the country origins and standing as determined by 
human rights authorities and assignment of a numeric score. The 
majority of human rights data on forced labor in seafood produc-
tion exist at the country level, and we drew from the list of goods 
produced by child labor or forced labor, the list of products produced 
by forced or indentured child labor, findings on the worst forms of child 
labor (7), the Trafficking in Persons Report (8), and the Global Slav-
ery Index to assign product country-level scores. We considered the 
status of a country’s commitments to the ILO forced labor conven-
tions 29, 98, and 182; the Palermo Protocol; and the Port State Mea-
sures Agreement as an indicator of prevention.
For some products, not all country-level origins were visible. Wild- 
caught seafood products, for example, had inputs from the flag states 
of the fishing vessel and refrigerated cargo vessels, from the countries 
of landing, primary and secondary processing, export, and some-
times re-export. Aquaculture products had inputs from all of these 
and the countries supplying fry, feeds, and farms. We found that 
few companies tracked product origins systematically or the fishing 
vessel and farm origins. We recommended establishing a line of com-
mand upstream and preparing a complete list of vessels and farms. 
To assist, we prepared supply chain diagrams.
Supply chain mapping
The second component in the five-point framework is a template for 
mapping a seafood supply chain (diagrammed for Indonesian shrimp 
in Fig. 3). This provides a simplified view of the complex flows of 
raw materials and people, starting with the trade details. We found 
that mapping the human rights data onto supply chain diagrams 
increased the resolution of the known risks of forced labor. For ex-
ample, in Pacific tuna supply lines, forced labor conditions have been 
reported in the waters of Papua New Guinea, onboard vessels operated 
by fleets from the Philippines (27) and Korea (28), and also in the 
waters of the Solomon Islands by the Taiwan tuna fleet (29). Sex 
trafficking has been reported of women and children in service of 
the fleets landing tuna in the Marshall Islands (30) and Kiribati (31). 
Trafficking of Cambodian fishers who were recruited by an estab-
lished labor agency has been reported (21, 25). Supplemental context 
was provided by media reports, which allege cases in the Korean 
and Taiwanese fleets fishing tuna in Fijian waters (32, 33), on Thai 
fishing and cargo vessels (reefers) transporting tuna from the Pacific to 
Singapore and Thailand for processing and export (34), and on tuna 
reefers operating in Papua New Guinea waters and vessels fishing in 
Indonesian waters (35, 36). Figure S1 provides results for Pacific 
yellowfin tuna exports from Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Marshall 
Islands, Vietnam, Fiji, and the Philippines.
Similarly, we prepared farmed shrimp chain diagrams for 
five leading export countries (table S1). In the farmed shrimp 
supply chain, fishmeal for shrimp feed and fry from shrimp hatch-
eries are transported to shrimp farms, and then saleable-size shrimp 
are transported to auctions, peeling, secondary processing facil-
ities, and export facilities that are sometimes in another country 
(re-export). For example, a consignment of shrimp farmed in 
Ecuador may be processed in Vietnam or China, before landing 
in the United States (37, 38). Others, such as Bangladesh shrimp, 
may be exported in unprocessed form after multiple trades across 
a string of wholesalers, erasing farm origins without adding value 
(39). Companies were particularly concerned with risks in feed supply 
chains. Feed supply chains are complex to assess for risks. In Thailand, 
Fig. 2. Tiered approach for screening a large number of products.
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ILO research indicated that 17 to 26% of workers on vessels fishing 
for feed products were subject to forced labor (40). Furthermore, 
outside of International Fishmeal and Fish Oil Organisation (IFFO)– 
certified facilities (41), transparency of working conditions to the 
feed level was weak to nonexistent.
Seeing risks at sea where transparency and legal compliance 
of vessels are uncertain
The third component in the five-point LSS framework is an algorithm 
to identify risks in the at-sea portion of the supply chain, which is 
often the least visible and least documented. The risk factors for the 
at-sea portion were identified and verified through an extensive, it-
erative process including input from fishing and human rights ex-
perts and workers to develop the risk assessment parameterization 
(Table 1). The algorithm was successfully deployed to estimate the 
transfers of people and raw materials at sea and around ports with 
available (albeit imperfect) data coverage. Companies who gathered 
vessel data to run the predictive algorithm for the at-sea portion of 
the supply chain consequently identified areas of exposure to illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) and trafficking in per-
sons (TIP).
A low aggregated risk score indicates good controls and an evident 
line of command for transfers and documentation. A high-risk score 
on any factor indicates a need for further diligence. In one dataset, 
the regulatory oversight for identity documents (seafarers book, na-
tional work permit) was low to nil, documentation of crew transfers 
at sea was unavailable but known to occur through supply vessels, 
the flag history of the supply vessel was unknown, and the refriger-
ated cargo vessels had a history with multiple flag changes in the 
previous 5 years, potentially indicating evasion from enforcement.
Seeing the working conditions in the supply chain  
and the workplace
The fourth component of the five-point framework involved online 
surveys to collect supply chain data from the suppliers of the product. 
The food companies received summary reports and learned where their 
suppliers have a reasonable knowledge of the workforce, contracting, 
proportion of foreign workers, and brokers, and where knowledge 
is limited or missing; for example, points in the supply chain where 
supplies from multiple origins are combined and resold. We provided 
the companies with questions to follow-up with suppliers privately.
Increasing transparency inside the complete supply chain is an 
important attribute of risk reduction for distant buyers because they 
cannot address an upstream hazard (whether it threatens labor or food 
safety) without accurate production data and a line of command. In one 
instance, a shrimp exporter located in Samut Sakhon (Thailand) re-
ported that less than 10% of the workers at his facility were migrants. 
This was in direct contrast to published ILO data, indicating that 
migrant workers make up 90% of the workforce in the same area (6). 
Triangulating supplier and human rights data allowed us to raise an 
important set of questions [had the exporter accounted for full-time 
employees only (for example, office staff ) and omitted subcontracted 
workers?], illustrating the importance of data triangulation at each 
level of the supply chain. In another instance, the working conditions 
reported by a surimi processor about its boats, refrigerated storage, 
seafood processing factory, and assistance to factory workers were 
consistent with reports by a local migrant rights organization.
Seeing conditions from the workers’ perspective
The most accurate way to characterize working conditions in a supply 
chain is by incorporating worker feedback. In Thailand, we undertook 
Fig. 3. Seafood supply chain diagram. The major nodes in the supply chain are shown in the top diagram. The bottom diagram shows updates as the identity of 
facilities was confirmed.
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a research partnership with the Labour Rights Promotion Network 
(LPN) for firsthand perspectives on work in surimi, squid, tuna, 
and other supply chains. In Hawaii, we undertook a research partner-
ship with the Hawaii Seafood Council, Hawaii Longline Association, 
and an independent social scientist (Amy Gough) for firsthand per-
spectives to employ in remediation.
Thailand’s fishing industry relies almost exclusively on migrant 
workers (40). LPN interviewed 197 fishing crew and processing plant 
workers in the Samut Sakhon vicinity for this study in 2015 (sum-
marized in table S2). Nearly every plant worker had come from 
Myanmar (82 of 84 people). They were paid the equivalent of Thai 
minimum wage, but many still owed brokers for travel costs of 1000 to 
16,000 baht ($32 to $507) and a 5500 baht fee to apply for a factory 
job ($174). Half of the respondents had worked previously on fishing 
boats and said they had moved up to the largely better working con-
ditions onshore in the processing sector. Of 113 men working on 
Thai fishing boats, 111 had no contract and were paid by labor agents 
on an irregular basis. Debt bondage was commonplace through a 
system of advances and fees by the brokers. For example, seafood 
workers said they were charged 10,000 baht ($317) for a cap, toothpaste, 
toothbrush, and boots, as well as for travel expenses and document 
fees, plus 4000 to 5000 baht per month for food ($127 to $158 per 
month at 32 baht per USD). Respondents from boats supplying surimi 
factories said their wages had increased. They lacked first aid training 
and equipment and reported fainting from inhaling the gases re-
leased from fermenting fish in the hold. Death of some fellow crew 
members from the unsafe conditions had been observed. Overall, 
the seafood workers said they generally lacked safety and occupa-
tional training and mechanisms to claim payments in the amounts 
initially agreed. Basic work costs were often deducted from their pay. 
They wanted assistance with their employers to improve their legal 
status, to obtain a contract and vocational training, and to file a 
Table 1. At-sea LSS risk assessment parameterization to assess transparency and legal compliance of vessels. 
Risk factor 1: Vessel ownership and home port Risk factor 2: Vessel registration and flag Risk factor 3: Sea-going crew
Where there is a joint venture fishing operation, who 
has the responsibility for labor management of 
the at-sea crew?
What is the registration status of the CV? What identity documents are carried by the crew at 
sea on the catching vessels?
What is the ownership of the CV [catching vessel(s)]? What is the registration status of reefer 
vessels that are greater than 100 GRT?
For at-sea crew transfers, what documentation is 
maintained on the vessels?
What is the ownership of the reefer vessel(s)? What is the registration status of reefer 
vessels that are less than 100 GRT?
What are the procedures that are routinely used to pay 
the crew for their sea duty?
What is the ownership of the supply vessel(s) for the 
CV?
What is the history of flags for the CV? Are the tasks/duties of the crew individuals at sea 
documented, and to what standards?
What is the Home Port (incl. fishing/private dock) for 
the CV?
What is the history of flags for the reefer(s)? How are the sea-going crew recruited?
What is the Home Port (incl. fishing/private dock) for 
the reefer(s)?
What is the history of flags for the supply 
vessel(s)?
To what extent are the labor practices associated with 
the at-sea crew documentation above confirmed by a 
process of certification?
What is the home port (incl. fishing/private dock) for 
the supply vessel(s)?
To what extent are the labor practices associated 
with the vessel ownership and home port identity 
above confirmed by a process of verification?
Risk factor 4: Vessel resupply, transshipping Risk factor 5: Governance framework Risk factor 6: Monitoring, control, and surveillance 
framework
What is the size of the catching vessel? What is the level of compliance with the 
international labor standards for fishing 
operations?
What is the history of the catching vessel in relation to 
regional, national, and industry labor or fishing 
standards?
What is the frequency of at-sea transfer of crew to 
the catching vessel?
What is the level of compliance with the Thai 
national labor standards for fishing 
operations?
What is the history of the reefer or supply vessel in 
relation to regional, national, and industry labor or 
fishing standards?
What is the destination of the vessel-to-vessel crew 
transfers?
What is the level of compliance with 
minimum voluntary (for example, codes of 
practice) labor standards for fishing 
operations?
In what ocean area are the fish caught?
What is the size of the reefer or supply vessel 
involved in crew transfers?
To what extent are the labor practices 
compliant with the standards described 
above confirmed by a process of verification 
or certification?
To what extent are the oversight of labor practices and 
source areas described above confirmed by a process 
of verification?
To what extent are the labor practices associated 
with the at-sea transshipping of crew described 
above confirmed by a process of verification?
Nakamura et al., Sci. Adv. 2018; 4 : e1701833     25 July 2018
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
6 of 10
complaint when needed. Positive changes and improvements were 
occurring in Thailand, they said, and helping to empower workers 
and raise awareness of their rights. Given a choice, 132 of 197 re-
spondents said they would stay with their current employer (67%).
In Hawaii, we used the worker data in the development of a new 
universal crew contract and labor code of conduct for the longline 
fleet. The interview set included the working conditions described 
by crew members from all language groups and home countries in 
the fleet, including Kiribati, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Fiji, 
and Papua New Guinea, and broker details and terms. The seafarers’ 
ministry, Filipino and Kiribati Consuls, the local Indonesia committee, 
and other community organizations also contributed perspectives 
from crew members. Concerns about livelihood security dominated 
worker data collected in interviews. Seeing the conditions from the 
workers’ perspective in Thailand and Hawaii caused us to reconsider 
our approach in 2015/2016. We shifted the basis of screening from 
attempting to prove or to disprove forced labor conditions in supply 
chains toward establishing system fundamentals for human rights 
due diligence.
Focus for improvements
The fifth component of the five-point LSS framework is a set of tools 
to incorporate findings and correct conditions. We developed prin-
ciples for minimum protective conditions in the seafood workplace 
(Fig. 4) and templates for human rights due diligence [a code of con-
duct, universal contract, grievance mechanism, and a disclosure state-
ment (table S3)]. These tools have been used in the Hawaii commitment 
to decent work in fishing and in a mandatory disclosure statement 
for fishing companies in the Marine Stewardship Council program 
for sustainable fisheries (a third application is proprietary). At present, 
125 fishing vessel owners in Hawaii are required to demonstrate 
that all crew have a double-signed universal contract written in their 
language. The United Fishing Agency auction at Honolulu’s Pier 38 
maintains the fleet’s file of letters of assurance from vessel owners, 
captains, and labor brokers of compliance to the fleet’s code of con-
duct for decent work in fishing. The code specifies minimum con-
ditions to protect workers from forced labor that derive from the 
principles, which are generally applicable to seafood workplaces. We 
prepared the principles through dialogue with fleet representatives 
and authorities at the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Inter-
national Labor Affairs.
Summary of results
Overall, the 18 food companies in our study used three or more com-
ponents of the five-point LSS framework and systematically docu-
mented their supply chains, engaged suppliers, and cross-checked 
results. They experienced successes and challenges in trying to collect 
and verify data in their supply chains, which we have illustrated with 
examples and details (based on public data and excluding proprietary 
data). Human rights due diligence was a new concept to the seafood 
sector in the study period. The methods that worked well were supply 
chain mapping (component 2) and using supplier and human rights 
data together (component 4). These were indispensable for seeing 
previously unknown and at-risk conditions in the supply chain, for 
example, where brokers are predominant. It was challenging to collect 
data on working conditions from suppliers with online surveys (com-
ponent 4). Respondents wanted to comply with their buyers’ requests 
but were concerned about losing business. The surveys were revised 
in 2016/2017 in part to de-risk the experience for suppliers and in 
part to improve the surveys in ways human rights authorities recognize 
to be legitimate. In the digital program, we found that suppliers did not 
maintain the labor code of conduct, universal contract, and griev-
ance mechanisms the survey asked for but were familiar with local 
labor laws and social certification programs. We added an open ques-
tion to collect all labor diligence efforts and avoid duplication and 
prescription. In Hawaii, we learned that remediation takes time and 
community engagement. The chain of custody documents (component 5) 
were revised in multiple rounds of stakeholder input and field testing 
Fig. 4. Field-tested principles for minimum conditions to protect workers from forced labor.
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to make sense to industrial fishing and seafood employers and to 
include specific references to the normative framework, for example, 
the C188 Work in Fishing Convention.
Slavery in seafood supply chains is an incendiary topic, and our 
intermediate goal was to resolve the finest possible scale of drivers 
and impacts from trade data and the factual accounts of workers 
and employers, and their representatives. We observed the drivers 
of working conditions in 118 supply chains, as well as the large-scale 
drivers of weak enforcement of labor and fisheries regulations and 
weak tracking of seafood product origins by companies and customs 
agencies worldwide. Forced labor in seafood coexists with overfishing, 
illegal fishing, corruption, and sex trafficking to service fishing fleets—a 
widespread problem documented by the U.S. Department of State. 
In the Pacific tuna hub of the Marshall Islands, for example, local girls 
and foreign women are recruited by foreign business owners to 
engage in prostitution with crew members of foreign fishing and 
transshipping vessels that dock in Majuro (30). In other parts of the 
western Pacific, seafood workers have benefited from regulatory 
changes that confront drivers of forced labor, for example, surimi 
workers in our study said that they benefited from better enforce-
ment in Thailand and Indonesia on vessels with previously strong ties 
to illegal fishing.
We are contributing interdisciplinary methods that we hope future 
researchers will use in service of decent work and labor safety in 
seafood. We learned that seafood companies want their vendors to 
have systems to identify risks and make improvements and to dis-
close their efforts. Companies said they wanted each entity in the 
supply chain producing the good before it reaches them to be re-
sponsible for protective working conditions in their operations. They 
wanted an onramp for the sector, and some wanted a seat at the table 
for the overall direction of the effort in the sector to ensure that it 
meets best practice, and particularly that it meets the highest-order 
legal tests from customs officials. Human rights authorities did not 
want the work done by companies to be token. They expected com-
panies to use knowledge and resources in the human rights sphere, 
to act on the findings from workers, and to make their efforts avail-
able for verification. The company executives and human rights ex-
perts who contributed to our study expected certification programs 
for seafood sustainability to incorporate human rights due diligence.
INTERPRETATION
Over a period of 5 years, our team developed a framework with five 
components to efficiently and effectively assess and manage the risk 
of forced labor in seafood supply chains. The framework was tested 
in the commercial sector and demonstrated utility for food companies 
importing seafood from around the world. By combining and ana-
lyzing existing public human rights and supply chain data through 
the new lenses provided by these tools, screening allowed companies 
to see deeper within their own sources of supply, and forced labor 
risk could be identified. Data drawn directly from workers provide an 
essential line of sight into actual working conditions, and more work-
er data are clearly needed to complete the picture and ensure that 
management programs are effective. We have shown that adding 
labor screening to existing digital platforms is an efficient way to 
learn about working conditions at scale, and that integrating the 
worker voice into these platforms produces a more accurate picture 
of working conditions across the supply chain (for example, data col-
lected from programs like Verifik8 and Ulula). This type of risk 
assessment helps companies target diligence and improvement re-
sources to the most at-risk aspects of their supply chain.
Through the course of this study, we identified four aspects of 
labor management that generally reduce the risks of forced labor. 
First is making a commitment to the principle of no forced labor. 
Properly, it means providing workers with a protective and actionable 
contract because enforceable agreements are a prerequisite for access 
to effective remedy, which, in turn, is necessary for brand account-
ability (42). Second is adoption of the employer-pays model. It means 
that the vessel owner or facility owner explicitly pays all costs of work 
and prohibits brokers from taking ongoing fees. The seafood com-
pany Thai Union adopted an employer-pays policy in 2016 (43). Third 
is contract consistency. The contract terms for work on the vessel 
must match the terms signed onto (for migrant workers, with 
the labor broker in the home country). The Seafood Task Force, an 
industry- led coalition, has audited labor documentation on Thai 
fishing vessels for consistency to improve product traceability 
and labor transparency (44). Fourth is free agent status. It means 
that contracted workers have the freedom to leave work (defined 
in the contract) and freedom to negotiate work terms, either indi-
vidually or as a group. When foreign crew members wish to change 
vessels in the Hawaii longline fleet, they are assisted with place-
ment and contracting changes by the vessel owners and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
In conclusion, it is clear that food companies can deploy a com-
bination of available procedures and data to effectively and efficiently 
assess and manage the risk of forced labor in their seafood supply 
chains. This capability gives the sector an opportunity to increase 
and expand protections to all seafood workers, including migrant 
people working in subcontracted conditions and commercial fishers 
working without a contract—who may represent a significant fraction 
of the estimated 28 million fishers in the industrial sector (3). The 
evaluation of risk in a supply chain produces no guarantee that prod-
ucts are free from labor risks, which can rarely be supported (45, 46), 
but, set in a supportive implementation context such as that of the 
LSS, it provides a specific focus on the most urgent points for next 
steps. Ideally, robust risk assessment and remediation should be part 
of a multipronged strategy for sustainable seafood, which is socially 
responsible (47) and includes a strategy to hear directly from workers 
at the forefront, and therefore to engage frontline organizations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview
We developed a five-point framework to screen seafood products for 
the working conditions in the making of a product. In component 1, 
a seafood product was first considered from all possible countries of 
origin, and a numerical score was assigned. Next, the supply chain was 
diagrammed with trade data and data on producer demographics 
(component 2). For fishing operations, an at-sea risk score was gen-
erated with available data (component 3). We collected proprietary 
data from the suppliers to participating companies and worker data 
from human rights authorities (component 4) and subsequently tri-
angulated all data available. Some companies in our study incorporated 
our findings and corrected conditions with assistance from work-
place principles and templates we developed for their use for reme-
diation (component 5).
Overall, this interdisciplinary study combined manual and auto-
mated approaches to gather information from the public domain, 
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directed survey, and semistructured interviews. The approach to risk 
evaluation was the product of interdisciplinary methods used in a col-
laborative process to engage with a broad range of experts and expe-
rience in the food industry, human rights, fisheries science and risk, 
food safety and traceability, labor and counter-TIP agencies, and 
mentors from the apparel, mining, and electronics sectors to deter-
mine the type and location of potential labor risk in supply chains. 
Primary data collected through interviews with anti-human traffick-
ing experts (25 interviews) and industry executives (26 interviews) 
also contributed to the development and testing of the five-point frame-
work. The five-point framework was presented at GOAL, Boston Seafood, 
and SeaWeb trade shows and conferences in the seafood sector in 
2014–2017, and the participating companies were self-selected.
LSS components 1 and 2
We began screening by looking at all possible countries of origin for 
the seafood product in component 1 and by developing a numerical 
score. For example, Indonesia shrimp products scored 55 and fish 
products scored 65 because Indonesia has ratified the Palermo Pro-
tocol and ILO C29, C98, and C182, and Indonesian fish is on the list 
of seafood goods made with significant forced labor (7) and shrimp 
is not. We set a score of 60 or greater as an arbitrary threshold for 
recommending further investigation.
Product supply chains were conceptualized graphically in LSS com-
ponent 2 and populated with published evidence on seafood pro-
duction and working conditions. A unique diagram was prepared 
for each export product and included all levels of production and 
the majority of raw material inputs: fishing area, fishing countries, 
vessels and gear, or alternatively feed source fisheries, hatcheries, 
and farms for aquaculture, landing and local trade, processing, export, 
and retail. Proprietary data from supplier surveys complemented public 
domain data/knowledge (by using LSS component 4, see below).
LSS component 3
At-sea workplaces—vessels and ports—are notoriously difficult for 
surveillance of labor risk (19). To address this, we developed an al-
gorithm for LSS component 3 using a likelihood and consequence 
structure, with a set of utility function relationships derived empirically 
from the literature and proprietary data/knowledge. We derived risk 
parameters from a set of empirical relationships known or predicted 
by existing reports of labor risks onboard vessels and around ports. 
This risk assessment framework was coded into an expert system 
algorithm, which uses 34 data entry questions to produce 0 to 100 
scores in a likelihood and consequence model of risk assignment. 
The data are weighted by verification in the algorithm: If a response 
is validated with high-quality public data, it is weighted 100%, or 
50% where it is not. The data entry questions elucidate the history 
of a product in relation to each risk parameter, and the algorithm 
assigns a performance level relative to a utility function derived from 
the available literature and datasets. The risk factors include a range 
of factors that have been linked to IUU and labor violations, includ-
ing vessel history of flag states, vessel ownership and history of com-
pliance with international seafaring rules, and the destinations 
and the frequency of at-sea transfers of raw materials and crew 
(Table 1). Risks can be estimated with vessel data provided by the 
supply chain or independent accounts and databases. Outputs were 
provided as kite graphs, which were internally consistent and easily 
interpreted to identify points of risk that are susceptible to corrective 
action.
LSS component 4
We collected supply chain data on product, facility, and producer 
characteristics in online surveys from the suppliers to participating 
companies (www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/LSS_Supply_Chain_Questionnaire 
and www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/Farmed_Shrimp_Questionnaire/). The 
online surveys were produced collaboratively with assistance from a 
seafood supply chain expert and from a senior executive at Thai 
Union, a major Thai seafood company, in 2014. Data were collected 
from suppliers with Thai language support in 2014–2016. We addi-
tionally produced and piloted surveys to test for proof of minimum 
protective conditions from forced labor in specific supply chains. 
We collected and used data from the surveys as a basis for scoring 
the risk in products and to move upstream in the chain from exporters 
and processors to first receivers.
LSS component 5
Three companies in our study incorporated findings from risk 
identification and corrected conditions. We developed workplace 
principles and templates for their use in an iterative and multistake-
holder process, which involved trialing and revision for general 
applicability through peer review with industry and human rights 
experts and regulatory authorities. For example, the disclosure 
statement for fishery clients to the Marine Stewardship Council 
program was vetted and revised line by line in a stakeholder work-
shop in November 2017 and public consultation in early 2018 
(48). A generic disclosure statement is provided in table S3.
Continuous monitoring
We adapted a version of the LSS and embedded it in the seafood 
traceability program by Trace Register LLC of Seattle. The “Labor 
Safe Digital Certificate” gives companies an option to deploy con-
tinuous monitoring, achieved by automating information inputs and 
scoring all products first at the country level (component 1) and 
second at the supplier and facility levels (component 4). This pro-
vides the user with knowledge of which products come from high-
risk origins in near real time, based on available public data and 
digital information already collected in the program. The total 
aggregated score combines product risk and facility risk. The facility 
owner can improve the score by demonstrating, or beginning steps 
for, human rights due diligence and by disclosing their efforts to 
their customers.
With this proof of concept, we won the grand prize in the Part-
nership for Freedom challenge in 2016 to rethink supply chains with 
technological solutions that identify and address labor trafficking in 
global supply chains for goods and services. The program was piloted 
in 2017, partially satisfying our hypothesis that food companies can 
identify risks by adding a labor safety dimension to their tracking 
and traceability systems.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/4/7/e1701833/DC1
Supplementary Methods
Table S1. Summary of country-level labor risks in farmed shrimp.
Table S2. Findings from semistructured interviews with Thai seafood workers (n = 197).
Table S3. Disclosure template for seafood suppliers to prepare a human rights statement.
Fig. S1. Pacific yellowfin tuna supply chains for six Asia-Pacific nations supplying the U.S. 
market.
Fig. S2. Supply chains for shrimp from five major exporting countries and for fishmeal.
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